Introduction
In recent years, anecdotal evidence from China's securities markets suggests changing standards of executive compensation. In 2008, China Southern (Stock code: 600029) suffered a huge loss of 5 billion yuan, which Our study makes the following contributions. First, we investigate the effects of both profits and losses from CFV on executive compensation. Previous studies have paid more attention to the sensitivity of executive compensation to PCFV (Hou and Jin, 2010; Xu and Zeng, 2010) and the sensitivity of executive compensation to LCFV is less commonly observed. We find a positive relationship between executive compensation and CFV, whether those changes involve profits or losses. This finding verifies the potential usefulness of contracts for controlling executive compensation in relation to CFV. In other words, the compensation contract is a valid tool to some extent. Second, we provide evidence to confirm the asymmetric sensitivity of executive compensation to CFV. Third, we investigate both the asymmetric sensitivity and the effects of managerial power on levels of executive compensation. This investigation makes contributions to two research streams. We use the theory of managerial power to explain the asymmetric sensitivity of executive compensation to CFV and we find new empirical evidence concerning the effects that managerial power has on compensation, while providing a reasonable explanation for compensation stickiness.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional background and literature review. Section 3 provides the theoretical analysis and develops testable hypotheses. Section 4 outlines the research design, including the sample selection, data sources, variable definitions and descriptive statistics. Section 5 provides the empirical results and Section 6 draws conclusions. 
. SOE reform and executive compensation
Since the market-oriented enterprise reform in 1978, operating performance has been taken into consideration by decision makers when designing executive compensation contracts. Along with the SOE shareholding system reform, the launching of the split share structure reform and the development of capital markets, the structure of executive compensation in SOEs underwent several major institutional transitions. In 1984, The CPC Central Committee's Decision on the Reform of the Economic System proposed the principle of distribution according to work. In 1986, Certain Provisions of the State Council on Deepening the Reform of Enterprises to Enhance the Vitality of Enterprises advanced a proposal that the personal salaries of managerial operators could be one to three times higher than those of staff and workers. In 1992, the Ministry of Labor and the Economic and Trade Office of the State Council issued a new rule named To Improve Income Allocation of SOE Operators, which for the first time required that managers' salaries be linked to their work performance. In 1995, the State-owned Assets Administration Bureau (which is in charge of assessing, maintaining and increasing the value of state-owned assets) claimed that managers' salaries must be connected to their performance assessments. In 2003, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) issued the Interim Measures for the Performance Evaluation of the Person in Charge of the Central Enterprises, which both encouraged and constrained enterprise supervisors in the design of incentive contracts and assessments of operating performance. In 2004, the SASAC further issued the Interim Measures for the Compensation Management of Central Enterprise Principle, specifying that compensation should follow a central enterprise principle and be comprised of basic pay, long-term incentive pay and performance pay, with performance pay determined by operating performance. In 2009, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security issued its Guidance to Further Regulate the Compensation Management of Central Enterprise Principle. This policy further regulated the incentive mechanism in pay levels, pay structures, post-consumption, management and oversight, and organization and implementation. The evolving development of the executive compensation system shows that policy governing executive pay has been designed increasingly in relation to operating performance. However, it cannot be ignored that the gradually liberalized standards for executive compensation are progressively controlled by managers themselves, resulting in astronomical salaries due to state ownership and insider control.
Introduction of fair value into new accounting standards and CFV as a new item of income
The new enterprise accounting standard system was issued by the Ministry of Finance on February 15, 2006 and was implemented for listed companies starting January 1, 2007. As the new accounting standard recognizes the measurement attribute of fair value, CFV was added into company income statements as a new item for reporting profits or losses originating from changes in the fair value of assets or liabilities. According to the new standards, these changes in fair value should be reported as gains or losses in the current period's income statement. Except in the case of financial enterprises, profits and losses from changes in fair value must be reported on transactions involving the trading of financial assets or liabilities, derivative financial instruments and investment property. The introduction of fair value into the new accounting standards included setting-up a new item in the income statement, distinguishing investment gains or losses with different levels of risk, improving the relevance of accounting information and enabling better decision-making by investors or managers. However, whether these changes in accounting standards affect executive compensation is still an open question.
Literature review
Many scholars have explored the issues of CFV, executive compensation and managerial power. We categorize these studies into three topics.
CFV and executive compensation
From the perspective of contracting theory, Hou and Jin (2010) study the influence of CFV on executive compensation after the implementation of the new accounting standards. They find that both PCFV and LCFV tend to increase executive pay levels. Zhou et al. (2010) find that CEOs and chairmen are responsible for gains or losses from short-term investment property, but their salaries are insensitive to CFV. Also, CFOs are in charge of funding operations and their compensation is positively sensitive to CFV. Xu and Zeng (2010) document that PCFV has a positive effect on executive compensation and that the incentive effects are significantly higher than for other earnings items. LCFV, however, is not significantly sensitive to executive compensation. They confirm that an asymmetric sensitivity of compensation to performance does exist in A-share listed Chinese companies. In other words, irrational incentives to profit from PCFV contrast with motivations to avoid punishment for LCFV. Zhang et al. (2011) find that PCFV (or LCFV) entering the income statement and directly credited into capital surplus is positively related (or not relevant) to changes in executive compensation. They conclude that contracts for executive compensation in listed Chinese companies fail to properly deal with changes in fair value.
Sensitivity of executive compensation to performance and executive compensation stickiness
According to agency theory, compensation is naturally related to performance. However, scholars disagree over the nature of this relationship. Taussings and Baker (1925) were among the first to focus on this relationship and they find little relationship between compensation and performance. Figler and Lutz (1991) and Tosi et al. (2000) find a weak relationship between the two. The opposite conclusion is drawn by McGuire et al. (1962) , Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) , Jensen and Murphy (1990) and George and Hall (1998) . Conyon (2006) argues that the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance has increased year by year in the United States. However, domestic research in China has not reached such a consensus on this matter. Zhang et al. (2003) , Du and Wang (2007) , Lu (2008) and Jiang (2008) all find evidence that performance and compensation are significantly related. Li (2000) , Wei (2000) and Chen and Liu (2003) , however, provide evidence of a non-significant relationship between compensation and performance.
The notion that executive compensation is sensitive to performance does not necessarily mean that changes in performance bring changes of the same magnitude in compensation. The influence of performance on compensation differs in situations of performance growth or decline. In other words, compensation is sticky. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Sun and Liu (2004) find that executives are reluctant to reduce their pay for reasons of personal reputation and career advancement. Gaver and Gaver (1998) find that CEO pay is significantly related to rises in operating profits and non-recurring profits, but it does not fall due to operating losses or non-recurring losses. Dorff (2005) also finds that executive compensation is more sensitive to positive earnings performance than to financial losses, which means that compensation is only influenced by good performance. Fang (2009) provides further evidence of the asymmetries in the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance in China. Xu and Zeng (2010) also find the phenomenon of big reward, light penalty in Chinese listed companies.
Managerial power and executive compensation
Since Bebchuk et al. (2002) presented their theory of managerial power, this understanding has played an important role in explaining executive compensation levels, the sensitivity of compensation to performance, the changing structure of compensation and the evaluation of operating performance (Lu and Wei, 2008) . Otten (2008) selects 1393 compensation contracts from 451 companies distributed in 17 countries between 2001 and 2004. The results document that the theory of managerial power is universally applicable. A significant body of empirical research documents the effects of managerial power on executive compensation. Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) find that CEO pay grows faster in enterprises controlled by management. Core et al. (1999) find that managerial power is stronger and CEO pay is higher in enterprises with large-sized boards and with outside directors who are mostly appointed by the CEO. Bebchuk et al. (2002) present evidence that the stronger the managerial power, the stronger the managers' ability to gain from rents and control their own salaries. Cyert et al. (2002) find that the pay of CEOs who serve as chairmen of the board is 20-40% higher than that of other CEOs. Duffhues and Kabir (2008) document that executives control their own pay through managerial power. Fahlenbrach (2009) finds that increases in the managerial power of CEOs significantly improve their pay. Cheng and Indjejikian (2009) find that CEOs exert a strong influence in formulating their compensation contracts and are capable of influencing their boards on compensation assessment.
In the context of China, many domestic scholars have studied the influence of managerial power on executive compensation in listed companies, taking account of China's particular institutional background. Pan and Tong (2005) find that top managers of Chinese public companies design their own compensation contracts and assess their own performance. Zhang and Shi (2005) find that the proportion of independent directors on the board, the establishment of a compensation committee and the duality of chairman and CEO roles all have significantly positive effects on executive pay levels. Lu (2008) finds that managerial power is positively related to executive pay. Lyu and Zhao (2008) find that SOE managers with strong executive powers design their own incentive portfolios and obtain higher pay largely through bonuses. In contrast, managers with weaker power are more concerned about their salaries and manipulate earnings (or fictitious profits) to satisfy the compensation assessment requirements. Quan et al. (2010) examine SEOs and find that managers with increasing power are inclined to obtain performance pay through earnings management, which means that the stronger the managerial power, the more sensitive compensation is to manipulated performance.
Theoretical analysis and hypothesis development
The separation of ownership and control in modern enterprises results in an agency problem. According to agency theory, the principal assigns tasks to the agent, whose objective function is different from that of the principal. This difference in functions leads agents to defend their interests against those of the principals. The determination of executive compensation is one such agency problem in which optimal contracting theory holds. Incentive contracts are an effective way to solve the agency problem. A favorably designed executive compensation contract is supposed to be an effective mechanism to make the goals of both managers and stockholders compatible and to reduce agency costs. A well-functioning contract can also prevent executives from pursuing goals detrimental to shareholders' goal of value maximization, as such deviation would be an example of the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990) . Managerial compensation and corporate performance are connected through an effective contracting arrangement. The more sensitive executive compensation is to corporate performance, the more closely aligned executive interests are with the interests of stockholders. The best way of designing a contract is to pay according to performance (Jenson and Murphy, 1990) . In an optimal contract, executive compensation is linearly related to performance (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) . Performance measured by audited earnings may reduce the noise caused by market volatility in determining executive compensation (Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Sloan, 1993) , as earnings are more sensitive and accurate than market performance (Xu and Zeng, 2010) . Earnings better reflect management's fiduciary obligation and operating efficiency (Natarajan, 1996) and thus should be the basis of performance evaluation.
The new enterprise accounting standards issued in 2006 improve the relevance of executive and accounting performance (Hou and Jin, 2010) . These standards also enhance the effectiveness of measuring executive compensation against accounting performance. According to the new standards, CFV is directly introduced into operating income as an earnings item, which leads to a great change in the structure of accounting and makes CFV an important element affecting performance reports. The investment and management of financial assets and investment property are the main contributors to CFV. Despite being theoretically determined by the market, CFV is in fact decided by managers, who decide on the options of purchasing, holding or selling financial assets. It is undeniable that shareholder wealth is directly affected by CFV arising from past decisions by the managers. As optimal contracting theory claims, effective contracts must make the managers' financial results and their pay connected to the highest degree possible. Hence, we suggest that CFV is positively related to executive compensation and propose the first hypothesis.
H1. Executive compensation is positively related to CFV.
Although compensation contracts are theoretically based on optimal contracting theory and are an ideal method for solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers, in reality the contract is often far from perfect. Three preconditions are necessary to ensure that optimal contracting theory works well. These include effective negotiation by the board, efficient constraint by the market and effective execution of power by stockholders. In many cases, these preconditions are far from being realized (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) . In theory, executive compensation is sensitive to corporate performance, but the reality in the business world is quite different (Edmans et al., 2008) . Once a flawed contract has been accepted, shareholders face the risk of rent appropriation by management (Grossman and Hart, 1983; Hart and Moore, 1990) .
The theory of managerial power provides a new explanation for the gap between compensation contracts and actual compensation. This theory argues that management influences levels of compensation by interfering with compensation contract design and deriving rents from company profits. The more control managers have, the stronger their rent-grabbing capacity (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) . According to the theory of managerial power, increases in the sensitivity of compensation to performance do not result in a decrease in the agency cost between shareholders and management, because corporate performance contains much noise. 5 Market noise is caused both by objective factors from the effects of the macro-economic environment or industry development on corporate performance and by subjective factors such as earnings manipulation by management (Quan et al., 2010) . Performance-based compensation contracts induce earnings manipulation by managers, because the contracts push mangers to make efforts toward the contract objective. Thus, while compensation contracts aim to remove one agency problem, they lead to a different agency problem.
As fair value is introduced into the new enterprise accounting standards, it becomes a new item in the compensation contract. According to the theory of managerial power, the assessment of fair value becomes a new method for managers to manipulate earnings and a new means for enhancing the contract's efficiency in serving managers' interests. The coexistence in China of deficiencies in property rights, deficiencies in securities market regulation, the desire for power by private owners, weak internal controls and fatherly love given to SOEs by the government (Lu, 2007a ) make the valid oversight of management in Chinese listed companies almost impossible. Such absence of constraints on managerial power makes the rent-seeking motivation of managers stronger. In this way, managers can both hire and supervise themselves, becoming both designers and implementers of their compensation contracts . Executives can increasingly demand higher salaries based on the excuse of PCFV (Hou and Jin, 2010) . When changes in fair value earn profits and operating performance is thereby improved, executives attribute the improvement to their own efforts and gain a louder voice in formulating their compensation plans. Likewise, executives use managerial power to excuse LCFV in a disguised or opportunistic way (Na, 2009) . They attribute losses to external factors such as market changes to free themselves from obligations and do so with impunity. The sensitivity of executive compensation to corporate performance is asymmetric and is characterized by stickiness, which means that an increase in executive pay on account of performance growth is higher than a decrease in executive pay on account of performance decline (Fang, 2009 ). Hence, we argue that the increase in executive pay due to PCFV is higher than the decrease in executive pay due to LCFV. The stronger the managerial power, the more asymmetric the sensitivity of executive pay is to CFV. The above analysis leads to the following two hypotheses:
H2. Increases in executive compensation due to PCFV are significantly higher than decreases in executive compensation due to LCFV.
H3. The stronger the managerial power, the more asymmetric the sensitivity of executive compensation is to CFV.
Methodology

Data and sample
Our initial sample consists of 4893 Chinese firms listed on the A-share stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen between 2007 and 2009. We drop observations from finance and insurance firms, and from firms with no changes in profits or losses due to changes in fair value. After merging the different sources of data and deleting observations with missing information, we obtain a final data set consisting of 1148 firm-year observations.
Data related to all variables was retrieved from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database offered by GTA Information Technology Co., Ltd.
The sample screening process and distribution are detailed in Table 1 . Panel A of Table 1 reports the sample screening process and yearly distribution. It shows that the 1148 observations are evenly distributed across the Executive compensation is mainly composed of monetary compensation and stock option incentives. Due to the lagged implementation of equity incentive plans in China, few companies use these types of incentives and their effect on compensation is limited (Xin et al., 2007) . Executive compensation is strictly regulated by the government and few managers in Chinese listed companies hold ownership of stock (Li, 2000) . Hence, previous studies show that monetary compensation is generally the same as executive compensation. Considering the different definitions of the term executive, executive compensation is commonly measured by the monetary compensation of the top three managers (Lu, 2007b; Fang, 2009; Hou and Jin, 2010; Quan et al., 2010) , by compensation of the top three directors (Lu, 2007b; Fang, 2009; Hou and Jin, 2010; Quan et al., 2010) , by compensation of the top three directors, supervisors or managers (Xu and Zeng, 2010) or by compensation of the chairman of the board, CEO and CFO (Zhou et al., 2010) .
We examine the influence of CFV on executive compensation. To undertake a thorough investigation of this relationship, we select the first three types of executive compensation discussed above as our dependent variables, which are respectively symbolized by lntm (monetary compensation of top three managers), lndir (monetary compensation of top three directors) and lncomp (monetary compensation of top three directors, supervisors and managers). The fourth type of executive compensation is classified into four variables: monetary compensation to the chairman of the board (lnchair), CEO (lnceo), CFO (lncfo) and the total of all three (lnchair_ceo_cfo). These variables are used in the robustness tests.
Independent variables
We use fair_value, measured as the amount of CFV in the income statement of the annual report, to proxy for profits and losses from changes in fair value.
Operating income (oper_inco) is calculated by deducting costs and expenses from revenue. The computation is as follows: operating income = operating revenue À operating costs À business tax and surcharges À sales expenses À administration expenses À interest expense À asset impairment losses.
Considering the close relationship between equity and CFV, both fair_value and oper_inco are adjusted by shareholders' equity at the beginning of each year (Zhou et al., 2010) .
Managerial power (power) tends to take on the characteristics of relativity (Quan et al., 2010) and concealment (Lu, 2008) , thus it is difficult to measure managerial power reliably and effectively with a single indicator. We select three main indicators of managerial power. First, duality of the chairman of the board and the CEO position is the most obvious manifestation of concentration in managerial power (Lu, 2008) . Second, ownership concentration can effectively control excessive managerial power (Chen, 2010) . When ownership is highly dispersed and controlled by various major shareholders, collusion can occur between major shareholders and managers (Huang, 2006) . Once the power of shareholders and managers becomes a joint force, managerial power tends to peak (Lu, 2008) . Third, executive tenure reflects managerial power from another perspective. With longer tenure, CEOs have a stronger ability to control companies. We thus use three indicators, power1, power2 and power3, to proxy for the three types of one-dimensional managerial power discussed above. Power1 is a proxy for duality (power1 equals 1 if the chairman and CEO are the same person, and 0 otherwise). Power2 is a proxy for ownership concentration (power2 equals 1 if the holding ratio of the largest shareholder divided by the accumulated ratio of the top two to ten shareholders is less than 1, and 0 otherwise). Power3 is a proxy for executive tenure (power3 equals 1 if the tenure of the chairman of the board or CEO is greater than the median, and 0 otherwise). Power is the comprehensive proxy of managerial power, quantified by the sum of Power1, Power2 and Power3. Power equals 1 when the sum exceeds 2, and 0 otherwise.
Control variables
In accordance with prior studies (Leone and Zimmerman, 2006; Fang, 2009; Hou and Jin, 2010; Zhou et al., 2010) , we also control for other variables that are related to executive compensation. These are the number of board members (board), the proportion of independent directors on the board (inde_dir), sales revenue (lnsale), sales growth (salegrowth), asset-liability ratio (leverage), adjusted annual stock return (adj_return), per capita income in the region where the corporation is registered (lnaver_inco), the nature of the company's property rights (soe), whether the company is cross-listed in other nations (cross), turnover of the chairman (chair), turnover of the CEO (ceo), the presence of a compensation committee (comp_comm), whether the company is in a regulated industry (regulate), whether the company is in a middle region (middle) and whether the company is in a western region (west).
More detailed information on the definitions of these variables is reported in Table 2 . Operating income, or the difference between operating revenue and operating expenses (which includes operating costs, business taxes and surcharges, sales expenses, administration expenses, interest expense, and asset impairment losses) divided by stockholders' equity at the end of the previous year power Dummy variable for managerial power. If power1 + power2 + power3 P 2, power is assigned the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Power1 is a dummy variable for duality. If the chairman and CEO are the same person, it is assigned the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Power2 is a dummy variable for ownership concentration. If the holding ratio of the largest shareholder divided by the accumulated ratio of the top two to ten shareholders is less than 1, it is assigned the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Power3 is a dummy variable for executive tenure. If the tenure of chairman or CEO is greater than the mean it is assigned the value of 1, and 0 otherwise Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics. As the table shows, there are no differences among the means (or medians) of lncomp, lndir and lntm. The amount of compensation ranges from 814,200 (e 13.610 ) to 1,077,300 (e 13.890 ) yuan, which shows an uneven distribution of executive compensation. Among the three types of measurements of executive pay, compensation of the top three directors is relatively low and compensation of the top three directors, supervisors and managers is relatively high. The mean (median) of fair_value is À0.001 (0) and the standard deviation is 0.059. The mean (median) of oper_inco is 0.133 (0.054) and the standard deviation is 2.053. The mean of power is 0.243, and the third quantile is 0, which means more than three quarters of the sample companies have lower degrees of managerial power.
As shown in Table 3 , about 60% of the sample firms are owned by the state, 16% (17%) experienced turnover of the chairman or CEO, 97% of the firms have constituted a compensation committee, 19% of the firms are located in the middle region, 13% of the firms are located in the western region and 68% are in the eastern region. The mean and median of adj_return are 0.261 and 0.038 (the great difference between these returns may result from the severe financial crisis in 2008). The mean (median) ratio of total liabilities to total assets is 64.3% (51.9%), which indicates a reasonable capital structure for the sample companies. The number of board members ranges from 4 to 16 with a mean (median) of 9.230 (9) board members. The mean (median) of inde_dir is 0.366 (0.333), which is consistent with the regulations of the China Securities Regulatory Commission. The minimum of inde_dir is 0.222, which indicates that some companies in the sample do not meet the required threshold of one-third independent members. The standard deviation of inde_dir is 0.053, which implies a slight change in the ratio of independent directors on the board over the time of the survey.
In general, all variables are normally distributed with little difference between the mean and the median (excluding oper_inco, salegrowth and adj_return). In addition, according to the standard deviation and first and third quantile statistics, there is adequate variation in the variables during the sample period.
Descriptive statistics of the three executive compensation variables categorized by positive or negative CFV are shown in Table 4 . As indicated in this table, compensation for all types of executives rises year by year and the growth in compensation in companies suffering LCFV is relatively higher than in companies earning PCFV. The three executive compensation variables show little difference in either their means or medians. In general, executive compensation does not change with changes in fair value. There is little difference in compensation in relation to changes in fair value, either in the mean or the median. In 2007, the executive compensation in companies earning PCFV is a little higher and the executive compensation in companies suffering LCFV is also a little higher. It is obvious that executive compensation in companies suffering LCFV is not less than executive compensation in companies earning PCFV, which means that LCFV has no significant influence on executive compensation. Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for our sample. Spearman correlation coefficients are reported in the upper right corner and Pearson correlation coefficients in the bottom left corner. Table 5 shows that there is no significant correlation between executive compensation and CFV (fair_value). Operating income (oper_inco) is positively correlated with executive compensation, which implies that operating income is a reasonable indicator to evaluate performance. Managerial power (power) is significantly correlated with executive compensation, which indicates that the greater the managerial power, the higher the executive compensation. Other variables such as board, inde_dir, lnsale, lnaver_inco, cross, comp_comm (not significant in the Spearman coefficient), middle and west are significantly correlated with executive compensation. These significant correlations indicate that bigger boards, more independent directors, greater sales and higher per capita income, cross-listing and compensation committees all contribute to higher executive compensation. Table 5 also reports that executive compensation in firms located in the middle and western regions is lower than that of firms in eastern regions. In addition, the coefficients in Table 5 suggest that the correlations between independent variables are reasonable. We further compute variance inflation factors (VIFs) and find that there are no potential multicollinearity problems among the variables listed in Table 5 . 
Correlation analysis
Empirical analysis
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 predicts that executive compensation is positively related to CFV. Following Dechow et al. (2010) , we use the following regression model.
Model (1):
comp ¼ a 0 þ a 1 fair value þ a 2 oper inco þ a 3 power þ a 4 board þ a 5 inde dir þ a 6 insale þ a 7 salegrowth þ a 8 leverage þ a 9 adj return þ a 10 ln ave inco þ a 11 soe þ a 12 cross þ a 13 chair þ a 14 ceo þ a 15 comp comm þ a 16 regulate þ a 17 middle þ a 18 west þ e
In this model, comp refers to the terms lntm, lncomp and lndir, and the regression coefficient of fair_value is our primary concern. If a 1 is significantly positive, then executive compensation is positively related to CFV. That is to say, CFV has a positive effect on executive compensation. Table 6 reports the regression results from Model (1). The dependent variables in columns 1-3 are the compensation of the top three managers (lntm), the top three directors, supervisors, and managers (lncomp), and the top three directors (lndir), respectively. Table 6 shows that the coefficient on fair_value is significantly positive for lntm, lncomp and lndir, which indicates that all three types of executive compensation are significantly related to CFV (a 1 > 0, t-values are 3.49, 4.14, and 7.96, 6 respectively). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. Concerning lntm, the regression coefficient means that if CFV increases by one unit, compensation of top managers increases by 69.7%. The probable reason for these results is that the board or compensation committee considers the effects of CFV on executive compensation when designing the compensation plan. As past investment decisions do affect shareholders' wealth and the compensation contract may be based on accounting performance, executives may use CFV as an excuse to ask for higher salaries (Hou and Jin, 2010) .
The results in Table 6 are not the same as the findings of Hou and Jin (2010) and of Xu and Zeng (2010) . Hou and Jin (2010) find that a positive relationship between executive compensation and CFV exists only when profits are earned from changes in fair value and a negative relationship exists when losses are suffered from changes in fair value. Xu and Zeng (2010) argue that the positive relationship between executive compensation and CFV is significant only in companies with PCFV and no significant relationship exists in sample companies suffering LCFV. We argue that several reasons contribute to these differences in results. First, our sample period is from 2007 to 2009, rather than the 2007-2008 period used by Hou and Jin (2010) and Xu and Zeng (2010) . Second, due to the global financial crisis in 2008, more than 80% of the sample firms suffered LCFV in 2008, as shown in Table 3 . This crisis may have had a great influence on the regression results for companies suffering from LCFV. In 2009, the securities markets recovered gradually and CFV became more normal. After the experience of the financial crisis, the boards or the compensation committees may have started to include CFV in compensation evaluation systems. Thus, CFV is also significantly related to executive compensation when companies suffer LCFV. Table 6 also reports that the coefficient on oper_inco is significantly positive at the 1% level, thus showing that executive compensation is sensitive to operating income. However, this sensitivity is lower than the sensitivity of executive compensation to CFV (a 1 = 0.697, a 2 = 0.042). There are two explanations for this. One is that income from operations and from investment are differentiated in the design of compensation contracts, with investment income from CFV showing a stronger relationship with the level of compensation. 7 The other 6 The significant correlation between executive compensation and CFV is not found in Table 5 . However, CFV has a significant influence on executive compensation after other variables are controlled for in Table 6 . Thus, we infer that one or more control variables must significantly change the coefficient of fair_value in the multiple regression analysis. To identify the relevant variables, we enter the control variables one by one into the regression equation of Model (1) and find that a significant positive relationship between executive compensation and CFV emerges after lnsale and cross are added into the regression. The addition of other control variables fails to change the coefficient of fair_value.
7 If the company earns one more dollar through business operations, the manager may get one more cent. If the company earns one more dollar through investment (or trading financial assets), the manager may get ten more cents. Although the above explanation may be plausible in theory, further exploration is required to determine whether this reflects reality in practice. explanation may be bias in the regression coefficient of fair_value, in other words, some variables are omitted in Model (1). Changes in fair value may reflect differences in profit models or other characteristics that affect the level of executive compensation. 8 Power is significantly positively related to executive compensation at the 1% level, suggesting that the degree of managerial power plays an important role in determining executive compensation and the greater the managerial power, the higher the executive compensation. The regression results of other variables are shown as follows. Board (only in column 3), inde_dir (columns 1 and 2), lnsale, leverage (columns 2 and 3) and comp_comm are all significantly positively related to executive compensation, which indicates that companies with bigger boards, more independent directors, higher sales, higher leverage, higher per capita income, and compensation committees all tend to set higher pay for executives. Soe, chair (columns 2 and 3), regulate (columns 2 and 3), middle and west are all significantly negatively related to executive compensation, which indicates that companies that are state owned, have experienced chairman turnover, are in regulated industries and are in the middle or western regions tend to pay less to executives. These finding are consistent with other studies (Fang, 2009; Hou and Jin, 2010; Zhou et al., 2010; Xu and Zeng, 2010) .
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the rise in executive compensation due to PCFV is significantly higher than the decrease in executive compensation due to LCFV. Following Fang (2009) , Model (2) is given as
In this model, compensation (comp) refers to the terms lntm, lncomp and lndir. Dum is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 for PCFV, and 0 otherwise. Our main interest is b 3 , the coefficient on the interaction term between dum and fair_value. If b 3 is significantly greater than 0, this means that the increase in executive compensation due to PCFV is greater than the decrease in executive compensation due to LCFV, then we can draw the conclusion that the sensitivity is asymmetric. Table 7 reports the results concerning the asymmetry of executive compensation on CFV. The coefficient on dum Ã fair_value is significantly positive in columns 1 and 2 at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively, which means that the sensitivity of executive compensation to CFV is strongly asymmetric. A probable explanation is that executives with strong managerial power may ask for higher compensation due to PCFV and find excuses to explain LCFV in an opportunistic way, to reduce losses to their personal salaries (Hou and Jin, 2010) . In column 3, the coefficient on dum Ã fair_value is negative but not significant, which demonstrates that the sensitivity of directors' compensation to CFV is not characterized by stickiness. A probable explanation is that most directors do not participate directly in the operation and management of companies, and have no ability to further their personal interests on account of CFV.
The regression results of other variables in Model (2) are consistent with those in Model (1).
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the stronger the managerial power, the more asymmetric the sensitivity of executive compensation is to CFV. Based on Model (1) and Model (2), we build Model (3) to test H3.
Model (3): In this model, comp refers to the terms lntm, lncomp and lndir. Dum is a dummy variable assigned the value of 1 for PCFV and 0 otherwise. Power represents the degree of managerial power, and equals 1 for strong managerial power and 0 otherwise. Our main interest is c 7 , the regression coefficient on power -Ã dum Ã fair_value. If c 7 is significantly greater than 0, Hypothesis 3 is supported. Table 8 reports the results of Model (3). The variable in column 1 is lntm, for which the regression coefficient on power Ã dum Ã fair_value is positive and significant almost at the 10% level. This result indicates that managerial power does have a significant influence on the stickiness of executive compensation and the stronger the managerial power, the more asymmetric the sensitivity of executive compensation is to CFV. Hypoth- esis 3 is partially supported. The regression coefficients on the cross-multiple items in columns 2 and 3 are both positive, but not significant, which implies that the level of directors' compensation is influenced by managerial power, but the influence is not significant. A possible explanation is that managerial power originates from management, and if most directors have no position in management, the management lacks motivation to seek higher compensation for directors. The regression results of other variables in Model (3) are consistent with those in Model (1). 
Robustness tests
Robustness test on the relationship between executive compensation and CFV
We use the compensation of the chairman (lnchair), CEO (lnceo), CFO (lncfo) and the total of these three (lnchair_ceo_cfo) as executive compensation variables to re-test Hypothesis 1. The results are shown in Table 9 . From the robustness test results reported in Table 9 , we find that lnceo, lncfo and lnchair_ceo_cfo are significantly positively related to CFV. The results are consistent with the conclusions of Zhou et al. (2010) . 9 9 Zhou et al. (2010) find that the CEO and chairman are not responsible for CFV and their compensation has no significant relationship with CFV. The CFO, however, is in charge of capital operations, and this officer's compensation is significantly related to CFV. Note: t statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
Robustness test on the asymmetry of executive compensation to CFV
We divide the sample into two sub-groups: one group comprises companies earning PCFV (D = 1), and the other comprises companies suffering LCFV (D = 0). We then conduct an F-test to examine Hypothesis 2, by testing the difference in the coefficients of fair_value between the two groups. The robustness results shown in Table 10 remain unchanged compared with those of Table 7 .
Robustness test on whether managerial power influences the stickiness of executive compensation
We further categorize the sample into two sub-groups according to managerial power, one group comprising companies with strong managerial power (power = 1) and the other group comprising companies with weak managerial power (power = 0). We conduct an F-test to verify Hypothesis 3 by testing the difference in the coefficient for dum Ã fair_value between the two groups and find that the results remain unchanged (see Table 11 ).
Eliminating the effects of the financial crisis
In 2008, domestic companies suffered severely from the global financial crisis. Taking into consideration the noise caused by this crisis on the value relevance of financial reports, earnings management and accounting conservatism, we drop the observations from 2008 and test the three hypotheses again. The results remain largely unchanged.
Eliminating cross-listed companies
Zhang (2011) finds that the sensitivity of compensation in cross-listed companies is significantly higher than that in mainland-listed companies. Therefore, we remove 72 cross-listed companies from the sample and test the three hypotheses again. The results remain largely unchanged.
Conclusions and limitations
Conclusions
Examining A-share listed companies on the Shanghai Securities Exchange and Shenzhen Securities Exchange from 2007 to 2009, we test the sensitivity of executive compensation to CFV. We draw the following conclusions: (1) CFV is positively related to executive compensation, and (2) the sensitivity of executive compensation is asymmetric to CFV. That is, executive pay rises higher due to PCFV than it declines due to LCFV. Further examination reveals that the greater the degree of managerial power, the more asymmetric the sensitivity of executive compensation is to CFV. These findings suggest the following policy implications.
With the implementation of the new accounting standards, changes in accounting measurement attributes have influenced the levels of executive compensation. The effects of CFV on executive compensation should therefore be considered in the design of compensation contracts and changes in fair value that come from management effort, from opportunism or from changes in the market environment should be reasonably distinguished.
This study offers some insights into the motives and methods of compensation manipulation using CFV. It suggests that in the design of compensation contracts, more attention should be paid to the dangers of management opportunism. The role that CFV plays in the compensation contract should be cautiously balanced.
If corporate governance and internal control mechanisms are perfected and the power of management to manipulate compensation is suppressed, then compensation contracts based on performance will function better and a rational compensation system may truly come into being.
Limitations
Despite its potential contributions, our study also has several limitations, which suggest possible directions for further research.
We excluded observations in which CFV was reported as 0 in annual reports, which may have led to bias in sample selection, thus limiting the generalizability of our conclusions.
The measurement of managerial power in our study only includes duality, equity disparity and managers' tenure, which are probably insufficient to accurately measure the real conditions of managerial power in Chinese listed companies.
We ignore perks in the calculation of executive compensation. Perks are common and even a major component of compensation in listed Chinese companies, especially in SOEs. Chen et al. (2005) find that perks are a substitute for bonuses for SOE managers who are under compensation regulation. Excluding perks from executive compensation may influence the results.
The effect of earnings management on CFV is also beyond our consideration. Ye et al. (2009) find that managers commonly recognize a large proportion of corporate financial assets as available for sale to reduce the effect of CFV on their income statements. In that case, it becomes difficult to account for managements' real intentions in holding financial assets and this factor may have affected our results.
Our study provides evidence on the sensitivity of executive compensation to CFV. In practice, however, there are many other factors that may affect executive compensation. Better handling of these issues will involve a complex process of developing standards, dealing with competing interests in the process of making contracts and better implementation and re-evaluation of compensation contracts.
